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Variations in Japanese Colonial Policy in 
Taiwan and Korea, 1895-1945 
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Japan’s seizure and early governance of Taiwan and Korea, both of which would become its 
most important subject territories, is widely understood by historians as being informed by the 
context of late nineteenth century “new” imperialism.  The belief, widely held in the West at the 
time, that the measure of a nation’s strength was dependent on the reality of its political control over 
territories outside of the metropole, was accepted by Meiji era Japanese elites. Believing that they 
had, in large part, successfully navigated the inaugural decades of a wide ranging policy of promoting 
economic modernization, these elites could more confidently hope that their nation’s recent 
technological, educational, and economic strides would translate into a capacity to project power 
outwards. Based on such confidence that, owing to it’s growing modernization, Japan had truly 
escaped the lot of the colonized in Asia and, moreover, could enter the ranks of the colonizing 
nations, rhetoric justifying colonialism on nation-strengthening grounds was more attractive near the 
century’s close. 
 Japan’s adoption of this overall justification for movement overseas and its subsequent 
expansion was consistent with the dominant trend of the age during which both took place. Both 
time and circumstance affected the creation of the early Japanese Empire to make its composition 
rather inconsistent with other empires of the period. Also, Japan’s rather late entry onto the modern 
world stage towards the latter portion of the second half of the 19th century – after over two 
centuries of prior European colonial activity - precluded a wider array of territory available for the 
taking. Additionally, Japan’s lesser economic power relative to expanding Western nations in the late 
1800s meant a comparative inability to sustain colony-acquiring expeditions far from home. Taken 
together, Western domination of empire building in the Asia-Pacific region and Japan’s limited reach 
steered the country’s earliest land grabs toward the region geographically nearest Japan itself, rather 
than toward more far flung locales. The nearness of Japan’s earliest major colonies, the first, an 
island due south of the home islands and just off the coast of China, and the second a peninsular 
nation nearer Japan than any other country, was crucial to their conquest by Japan.1 Close proximity 
to the conqueror obviated the need for Japan to mount a far off campaign of conquest. Indeed, the 
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close location of Taiwan and Korea meant that Japan’s initial seizure of them, as well as it’s ability to 
sustain political and military control over them, was never much hindered by the longer supply lines 
to the colonies that were endured by some Western powers. It is feasible to interpret the seizure of 
Taiwan and Korea as at least partially due to both lands being among the few portions of Asia 
available for colonial acquisition by the time of the emergence of a Japanese willingness and ability 
to expand.  Security concerns also played a role in Japan’s choice of early colonies, especially in the 
case of Korea. Japan’s expansion onto the peninsula was as much a function of attaining total 
control over a piece of strategic real estate geopolitically important to the security of the home 
islands themselves as other motives.2  
 The earliest Japanese colonies were not only geographically close to Japan but culturally 
close as well, being populated by peoples sharing, most notably, Chinese literary, cultural, and 
religious affinities such as Chinese ideograms, Confucianism, and Greater Vehicle Buddhism. 
Japanese colonizers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did not deny their nation’s similarities 
with their newly won subject peoples and often spoke of a desire to lead Taiwan and Korea out of 
decrepitude to modernity just as the Japanese themselves had modernized from 1868 onward. Both 
the main Western justification for colonialism that Japan adopted - which explicitly reserved the 
right for more advanced peoples to control lesser ones - and the slightly more altruistic tone of the 
desire to lead fellow East Asians evoked by feelings of racial and cultural similarity, preserved the 
ultimate power of Japan.3 Japan’s governance of Taiwan and Korea was informed by both kinds of 
rhetoric. The more European style of colonial governance, closer to the first justification, guided 
Japanese colonial administrators - especially early on. The subject peoples’ inherent inferiority to 
their Japanese masters was believed to make an administration which moved colonial peoples only 
gradually toward political, cultural, and social assimilation with metropolitan Japanese, preferable to 
one of rapid integration of the colonized with the colonizer. The other approach, which merely 
emphasized Japan’s cultural sameness with its Asian colonies during the earliest period of Japanese 
colonialism, later grew more insistent about the Asian provenance of the Empire. As developments 
in the wider world eroded Japanese colonizers’ confidence that sufficient time needed to work 
would be available for the earlier colonial policy, in the European vein of association, this approach 
turned into justification for a change in policy from association to fast-track assimilation.  
 Though this shift in Japan’s approach to the governance of its colonies took place in both 
Taiwan and Korea, significant differences in the effect of each approach underscores the very 
different environments in each location and the consequently different challenges, peculiar to each, 
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that faced the colonizer. The internal makeup of each colony, as well as its immediate pre-colonial 
history, gives some understanding of these challenges.  
Taiwan’s peoples presented a heterogeneous population. Though ruled by the mainland 
Qing dynasty as an adjunct to a coastal province from 1683-1885 and as a province in its own right 
from 1885 until Japanese occupation, it remained fragmented, restive, and difficult for Chinese 
administrators to govern. Although the initial years of Japanese administration would also be forced 
to contend with this traditional Taiwanese resistance to outside authority, the lack of an island wide 
identity or a pre colonial political order that commanded islanders’ allegiances worked to Japan’s 
advantage. Governing Japanese, hoping initially to compel islanders to submit to their authority or, 
slightly later, to encourage the islanders’ more active support of the colonial infrastructure, therefore 
did not have to compete against the entrenched, xenophobic, pre-colonial identity that had 
continued to exist in Korea after it’s annexation in 1910. Attitudes on the part of the colonial elite in 
both Taiwan and Korea were shaped by such basic differences within the colonies themselves as 
well as by the different ways each possession was conceived of in terms of strategic concerns of the 
metropolitan government. The Korea Government General, for example, was headed by Army 
Generals from annexation until the end of WWII.4 These Generals rebuffed liberal attempts to 
reform colonial policy in the 1920s and asserted the appropriateness of their military rule by citing 
Korea’s greater geopolitical importance to Japan’s safety over that of Taiwan.5 The slightly lower 
strategic priority given to Taiwan by the military and military-minded civilian policy makers meant 
that directives from the homeland were more closely followed on the island than on the peninsula.  
The often-contrasting policies pursued by Japan in Taiwan and Korea were planned, insofar 
as there was an element of colonial policy that responded to strategic and political concerns in the 
homeland. The policies were also responses to the reality of the level of acceptance or resistance to 
Japanese occupation in each of the colonies which was dependent as much on the innate political 
and cultural idiosyncrasies of each colony as on policies enacted by Japan after colonization.  
 
Taiwan: Frontier Island to Colonial Showcase 
Early Chinese settlement of Taiwan began largely in the early 15th century with the end of 
earlier Ming Dynasty prohibitions on Chinese maritime activity. The western coast of Taiwan 
proper, as well as the Peng-hu islands ninety miles from Taiwan between the island and the 
mainland, became settled by farmers who planted and tilled pristine ground there during the spring 
and summer months before retiring to their homes on the mainland during winter.6 Fisherman from 
3
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Fujian, the Chinese province directly across from Taiwan, also began living in the Peng-hu islands 
while they plied the surrounding waters every year during peak fishing season. During this time of 
seasonal Chinese settlement, however, no formal Chinese government writ ran on either Taiwan or 
nearby islets. The fact that Taiwan existed beyond the grip of the Emperor was at least a partial 
incentive for Chinese to begin immigrating. Other motives, at least early on, naturally included the 
plentiful amount of land available for the taking and the promise of few obstacles to settlement, save 
for resistance from scattered inland aborigines. The arrival of the Dutch East Indies Company on 
the island in 1624 accelerated the process of Chinese migrations across the Taiwan Strait. Though 
requiring up to ten percent of the crops yielded by both permanently settled and migrant Chinese 
farmers and requiring that those hunting the island’s deer first obtain licenses, which became a key 
source of revenue to the Dutch, Chinese migration continued. By some estimates Taiwan’s Chinese 
population grew as much as fifty thousand during the period.7  
Sent to Taiwan via self exile from a mainland invaded by ethnic Manchus - founders of the 
Qing Dynasty -Ming Dynasty loyalist Zheng Chenggong evicted the Dutch in 1661 and converted 
Taiwan into a redoubt from which he hoped to take back the mainland for the Ming. After Zheng’s 
death a year after his rule on the island, internal power struggles weakened his followers through the 
heavy-handed reaction of the Qing to political supporters of Zheng’s on the Fujian coast. This 
amounted to forced relocation and swelled Taiwan with even greater numbers of refugees.8  
The weakening of Taiwan’s administration among Zheng’s followers caused serious 
defections to the mainland within the armed forces - the centerpiece of any realistic bid for 
reclamation of China - precipitated eventual collapse in 1683.9 The victorious Qing opted, largely at 
the behest of Shih Lang – the conqueror of Taiwan for the mainland and former lieutenant of 
Zheng’s – to rule the island as a district of Fujian Province.  
Taiwan soon gained a reputation as a hardship post for Qing administrators. Clashes 
between Han Chinese settlers and aborigines, riots directed towards representatives of the central 
government, and conflicts among Han migrants of similar affiliation were commonplace. Over the 
course of the era of Qing control over the island, Taiwan experienced some 159 disturbances of 
varying type and size.10 Eventually, Taiwan became synonymous with instability and civil disturbance 
even among mainlanders. The island quickly came to be described as a place of overall lawlessness 
where, “Every three years [brings] an uprising, every five years [brings] a rebellion.”11  
The maintenance of central Imperial control over Taiwan was not only made difficult by the lack of 
central government institutions on the island but also because the migrants, who came to form a 
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majority on the island during the Qing period, had an entirely different outlook than Qing civil 
servants. The so-called Great Tradition, or the normative hierarchy, which denigrated merchants and 
exalted farmers and the scholarly class had been accepted as the ideal by successive Chinese 
dynasties after Confucius. It was little followed in Qing dynasty Taiwan, however, which had been 
populated by Chinese eager to escape the cultural strictures of the mainland. In addition, those 
brought from the mainland to run what little machinery of government existed on the island were 
not only of usually lesser quality than their mainland-posted counterparts, but were also products of 
a civil service that drew upon the Great Tradition for the training of prospective civil servants. 
Consequently, those agents of the Imperial government on Taiwan believed in the legitimacy of a 
normative hierarchical system and accompanying worldview entirely appropriate to most of the 
mainland with the exception of the coastal environs of Fujian. By contrast, most transplanted 
Taiwanese on the island, by virtue of their having migrated in the first place, at best ignored and at 
worst saw that system as a wrongful imposition worth rebelling against.  
 The Imperial government’s preference to loosely control Taiwan in order to avoid costly 
military involvement on the island was tested by the first decades of the 1800s. Western powers 
began to exert pressure on China for trading rights within the country and Taiwan as well. By the 
1860s the island ports of Tamshui and Anping were opened as treaty ports to western merchants, 
missionaries, and diplomats. In response to the these newcomers arrival, Qing bureaucrats began to 
fear that diffuse Imperial control over the island could lead to it’s seizure by a western colonial 
power. Such fears did inspire some measures to better fortify Taiwan against invasion by western 
expeditionary forces but did not prevent interventions by western trading powers in the latter half of 
the century.12 Japan conquered the northern half of the island in response to the deaths of 
shipwrecked Ryukyuan fisherman in 1874 at the hands of Botan aborigines and France threatened to 
seize the island as an indemnity after victory over China during the 1884-85 Sino-French War. The 
gains made by the French impelled some in Beijing to press for the inclusion of Taiwan within 
China as its own separate province – a move completed by the end of 1885.13 Attempts by Taiwan’s 
first and second Qing Governors to modernize the island laid the first tentative foundations for 
further achievements to be undertaken during the Japanese colonial period in the form of railroads, 
telegraph lines, and improved port facilities. Still, Qing power remained weak relative to the rest of 
China and Taiwan’s Chinese population as internally divided as ever.14  
Taiwan’s continued existence as an effective frontier province up to the time of Japanese 
annexation in 1895 would prove to be a fortuitous reality for incoming Japanese colonial 
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administrators. As in all lands newly conquered by expanding powers at the time, a major goal of the 
Japanese colonial proconsuls was the establishment and maintenance of law and order on the island 
following their seizure of it. The lack of a coherent Taiwan political identity would ensure no clear 
focal point of resistance to the imposition of colonial rule during almost the entirety of Japan’s 
dominion over Taiwan. Since Japan, owing to its greater technological and military strength, would 
succeed in more effectively controlling the island than had ever been possible during the Qing 
administration, many islanders seemingly acquiesced to the reality of Japanese control. This led to 
instances of effective anti-colonial resistance dwindling after a few short years. Coupled with native 
Taiwanese quiescence to Japanese authority, modernization begun under the Qing, but much 
accelerated under Japan, served as a kind of mandate for Japanese rule on the island. Altogether, 
Taiwanese came to recognize that outright violence against Japan would ultimately be fruitless. This 
recognition of the futility of physical resistance set the stage for later reform movements directed 
toward increasing Taiwanese participation in the island’s governance – though strictly within 
Taiwan’s identity as a subject territory.  
 
Japan’s decision to intervene on the Korean peninsula, ostensibly to protect Japanese lives 
and property during the millenarian Tonghak rebellion, occasioned the start of the First Sino-
Japanese War in 1894. The conflict would ultimately yield Taiwan to Japan as the latter’s first 
Imperial possession. Taiwan was never a real objective of Japan’s war aims at the conflict’s outset; it 
was Korea that most concerned military and political planners in Tokyo. The declining fortunes of 
the Korean Yi Dynasty portended a possible scramble on the part of major colonial nations to attain 
control of the peninsula. A destabilized Korea lying just across the Tsushima straits from the 
Japanese home islands was ominous enough to Meiji leaders, but Korea in the hands of a Western 
power might be disastrous.15 The immediate Japanese aim of the hostilities with Qing then, was to 
forestall Korean domination by a third country. However, as Japanese victories multiplied over the 
course of 1894 and Qing forces retreated in disarray, pressure mounted within Japan for territorial 
concessions from the Qing after final victory. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and his 
Foreign Minister worried about Western intervention should Japan’s advance threaten to imperil the 
Qing hold on power which would endanger the trading interests of Western governments in China.16 
The government still felt impelled by public demand to gain some territory after hostilities ended. It 
was believed that Taiwan could be taken without incurring Western intervention. Although high 
ranking Army commanders, who were disposed toward believing in Korea’s greater strategic 
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importance, thought the island too inconsequential a prize given Japan’s wartime sacrifice, the 
decision was made and the island was invaded in June, 1895, as peace negotiations occurred. Naval 
figures, contrasting the opposition to invasion of the island by their Army counterparts, supported 
Hirobumi’s decision and referred back to the effectiveness with which the French were able to 
blockade the Chinese mainland from the island in 1885. Should Japan not conquer Taiwan now that 
the time was right, prominent Navy men argued, a Western power could very well do so in Japan’s 
stead and then be in a position to put pressure on the southern home islands of Kyushu and 
Shikoku, as well as Okinawa.17 Ultimately, support for the taking of Taiwan was assured by the 
acceptance of the Western justification for colonialism by Meiji policymakers as well as by the 
masses. Bearing in mind that treaties guaranteeing extraterritoriality to foreigners in Japan remained 
in force in 1895, it was hoped by foreign policy jingoists and political moderates alike that the 
creation of an empire, run in the style of Western imperialism, could help rescind such treaties. 
Efficient control over other lands could, by implication, demonstrate Japan’s newfound strength and 
consequently, the treaty’s inappropriate application.18  
Despite the lack of any coordinated opposition to Japan’s invasion amongst large sections of 
the island population, violence was still present at the opening stage of Japan’s colonial suzerainty 
over Taiwan. Expeditionary forces fought village-based guerillas as well as mainland based militias. 
The entirety of the island was brought under Japanese sway with the taking of Tainan in the south 
by October of 1895.19 In keeping with the early emphasis on military operations and the 
extraordinary island-wide conditions believed to necessitate them, the first governor-generals of 
Taiwan instituted a large-scale policy of bandit suppression.20 The Triple Guard System predicated a 
policing of the island using military forces to patrol rural areas and police to patrol the cities while 
areas between municipal outskirts and open country were the responsibility of either force, 
depending on need.21 Taiwanese casualties mounted and the draconian tactics practiced under the 
Triple Guard approach, even by most Japanese accounts, did little to dent criminality or anti-
Japanese agitation in most areas. Sometimes the tactics transformed once placid areas into locales 
rife with anti-colonial sentiment.22  
Despite a fairly heavy-handed initial approach toward the local populace, the first two 
military governor-generals were not entirely focused on achieving control through strictly military 
means. Islanders wishing to leave after cession to Japan on April 17th 1895 would have two years to 
do so.23 The effect of this grace period for out-migration rid the island of Chinese who thought life 
under Japan was intolerable. Those that stayed were not necessarily pro-Japanese, but those who 
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elected to stay on Taiwan after 1897 implied some form of acceptance of Japanese rule. The out-
migration of those who would otherwise have fought the new order advanced the cause of 
supplanting the barely constrained chaos of the Qing period with the order promised by Japan and 
its earlier colonial bureaucrats, imbued with a belief in “scientific colonialism” and “association.”   
 
The arrival of the fourth military governor-general of Taiwan in February 1898, Kodama 
Gentaro, announced a marked change in the attitude of Japanese authorities to islanders. The days 
of bandit suppression were brought to a close as well as the Triple Guard System that had attended 
them.24 In place of counter-insurgent operations, the new Governor and his civilian chief of the Civil 
Affairs Bureau, Goto Shimpei, embarked on a different program. The new order took much from 
the commonly held doctrine of gradual assimilation, common among colonial theories of the day, as 
well as from Goto’s fondness for applying “scientific principles” to the domination of subject 
peoples.25  
Goto had studied medicine in Germany; his belief that biological laws could be applied to 
politics as well as the physical world may have originated there. Indeed, some historians have noted 
intriguing parallels between Goto and Bernhard Dernburg of brief German colonial fame. Both men 
shared an interest in governing territory as a kind of laboratory within which colonial administrators 
could interpret the outcomes of specific policies similar to the way technicians could determine the 
validity of a hypothesis through experimentation.26 To Goto, successful experimentation followed 
data collection and good synthesis of the accurate information collected. Visitors to his quarters in 
Taipei – renamed Taihoku after 1895 – were struck at his collection of works on colonial theory 
from a wide variety of sources. The large library, fairly comprehensive for the time, was just one 
indication that Goto’s lessons to his subordinates on the importance of information were whole-
heartedly followed by the man himself.27 As much a part of his general approach to colonial civil 
administration, however, was his belief in the inefficacy of a colonial government pursuing too fast a 
policy of assimilating a subject populace into mirror images of those in the metropole. Like almost 
all of his compatriots in the Government-General, Goto believed that the ultimate goal of Japan’s 
colonial endeavor, aside from resource extraction and occupation of areas of strategic import, was 
assimilation of the natives into normative Japanese. In this, he favored a gradual process. Before the 
1930s, he and other officials, in both Taiwan and later in Korea expected that true assimilation might 
be a process of hundreds of years.28 It followed from this reasoning that pushing for that ultimate 
objective unduly hard or fast might engender widespread rebellion of the native elites that could 
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then imperil Japan’s hold on power in the colonies as a whole. To Goto, this fear of meddling too 
far or too fast in the traditions of Japan’s conquered subjects was due to two beliefs. One was that 
only sufficient time could bring about a colonial peoples’ social and cultural absorption into the 
metropole. Another was his acknowledgement of the effect of the marked cultural similarities to 
Japanese that the Taiwan Chinese had.29 Japanese colonial policy did not have to move too fast, he 
and his successors opined, as unlimited time would be available. Goto shared this conceit with other 
early Japanese colonizers. More interestingly, according to Goto, Chinese cultural affinities with 
Japanese meant that the majority of Taiwan’s inhabitants were already well positioned for 
assimilation even prior to Japan’s arrival on the island, thus Japan did not have to move too quickly 
to achieve its assimilationist goal.30  
During his tenure as head of Taiwan’s civil affairs planning, Goto combined, in a series of 
policies, his appreciation of the Asian cultural provenance of the island’s Chinese with his desire to 
avoid unduly antagonizing the populace to the ultimate ideal of a Taiwan joined culturally to the 
home islands. The first policy was both a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the Triple Guard System  
that had taxed Japanese troops and civilian police and was a reflection of Goto’s belief in the 
wisdom of perpetuating native traditions where they happened to converge with Japanese interests. 
The pao-chia system of household and village responsibility and security had been utilized by 
Taiwan’s Chinese from the very beginning, having been first utilized on the Chinese mainland since 
the Qing takeover in 1644. Despite sometimes being impossible for the Qing to implement 
effectively, given the size of the Chinese landmass, the system as transplanted to Taiwan proved 
more effective, given Taiwan’s smaller area. Abortive attempts undertaken from 1895 – 1898 to 
organize “self-defense associations” within villages targeted by anti-Japanese bandits had not gone 
according to colonial authorities’ hopes. Goto, shortly after settling at Taihoku read the Complete 
Book on Benevolence in the original Chinese, which offered an outline of the pao-chia system. In 
order to lend momentum to the system’s adoption, Goto ordered the work translated into Japanese 
by the government’s Commission for the Investigation of Old Customs.31  The formation of 
individual family properties into groups of ten households each (pao) and ten pao into one (chia), 
made the villagers themselves responsible for law and order within their local areas. In addition and 
even more effectively, for Japanese purposes, the system mandated mutual responsibility.32 The 
Government General’s adoption of pao-chia, hoko in Japanese, meant that Japan now expected that 
Taiwanese engaged in sedition would incur punishments on their families and neighbors as well as 
on themselves.  
9
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The Government General’s approach to the education of Taiwan’s Chinese majority, like the 
adoption of the hoko system, was also a mixture of more than one assumption of early Japanese 
colonialism. In the context of education policy, the Government’s establishment and encouragement 
of Common Schools - as distinct from Chinese language private schools - was clearly calculated to 
instruct Taiwanese students in the proper way of the Japanese subject. To that end, Japanese 
language instruction was stressed, but colonial teachers were still careful to evince respect for 
thoroughly Chinese elements such as study of the Classic of Filial Piety.33 As much as anything, this 
and other concessions to the overwhelming Chinese component of the island’s majority culture were 
intended to attract traditional Chinese parents to the idea of sending their young to the common 
schools and thus slowly starve the private schools of students and the means to continue.34 By 1920, 
a quarter of Taiwan’s school age population was estimated to be attending Japanese run Common 
Schools. Private school enrollment of Chinese youth would steadily diminish until the government 
mandated the closing of all private schools in 1943.35 More to the point of ameliorating local elites, 
the Government under Kodama began to fete local notables, holding public ceremonies to 
recognize them as gentry-scholars of note. Further rewards included the awarding of medallions to 
mark the occasion.36  
Dissent from early Japanese colonial thought, as actualized through the policies put into 
place by Goto and his immediate successors, began in the second decade of the twentieth century. 
Government bureaucrats, journalists, parliamentarians, and Japanese educated Taiwanese were the 
principle groups involved in the agitation for change in colonial policy. Perhaps paradoxically, they 
buttressed calls for change with rhetoric that had been a central component for the rationalization of 
Japan’s Empire since its inception. The principle of isshi-doujin – “impartiality and equal favor [for all 
subjects of the Emperor]” – had emerged during the Meiji Restoration. The phrase was naturally 
highly ambiguous. Many have noted in the years following the dissolution of the Japanese Empire 
that the phrase could be used to press for equal rights for all the Empire’s subjects on the one hand, 
or to emphasize every subject’s duties and obligations to the sovereign on the other. To some, true 
achievement of the principle of isshi-doujin could only come after a period of meaningful interaction 
between Japanese and colonial peoples.37 Mochiji Rokusaburo, an ex-colonial bureaucrat, had 
echoed sentiments not entirely at odds with early Late Meiji Imperialist notions in his early writings 
when he tied Japan’s international reputation to effective and judicious colonial government, neither 
too exploitative, nor too lenient toward the natives. By 1912, however, he argued for more specific 
moves to engender real assimilation, or at any rate, his definition of proper assimilation and 
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achievement of isshi-doujin. Mochiji argued that the Japanese colonial elite needed to be less clannish 
in their living arrangements in the Empire and make an effort to interact with the locales so as to 
imbue them with “Japanese Spirit.” Mochiji would foreshadow the later Pan-Asian movement when 
he linked successful integration of Asian colonial peoples with Japan - through interaction between 
both colonized and colonizer - with Japanese expansion itself.38 Such thinking went further than 
Goto’s earlier acknowledgement of Asian cultural similarity between Taiwanese and Japanese and 
the boost such similarities would give to gradual assimilation. Mochiji had implied that future 
Japanese expansion could be justified as a process of encouraging cooperation among East Asians 
rather than according to the conventional European view of association.  
Within and without the home islands, a legal variant of isshi-doujin began to be voiced by 
1910s and 1920s. Legislators, newsmen, and other opinion makers within Japanese society began to 
question the correctness of limiting the Meiji Constitution’s application to the colonies. Advocates 
of full Constitutional applicability in Taiwan and Korea did not dispute the caveat that only those 
two colonies could be legally subject to Constitutional largesse, having been colonized in the name 
of the Emperor. By contrast, Japan’s South Pacific Islands - ceded to Japan by League of Nations 
Mandate - were not obtained by treaty in the name of the sovereign.39 They instead remained 
focused on the contradiction in terms between the letter of the Treaty of Shimonoseki – spelling out 
Japan’s claim to Taiwan – and the Treaty of Annexation, which clarified the nature of Korea’s 
takeover, and the merely selective application of the Constitution in both places. Originally 
promulgated by the Taiwan Government General in 1896, Law 63 gave sweeping powers to the 
Governor and contravened the nominal island wide authority of the Meiji Constitution as was stated 
in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.40 After the law’s extension in 1899, 1902, and 1905 largely because of 
perceived lawlessness on Taiwan, the Diet nullified the law and placed the Governorship securely 
under the Colonial Minister. However, Government House would retain significant powers and 
apply the Japanese Constitution to island affairs only when it felt the document would not constrain 
its powers.41 Doubtless the effect of pressure by supporters of wider constitutional authority within 
the so called “sovereign” colonies had little overall effect on the Constitution’s place in Taiwan’s 
governance. When compared to the aftermath of such agitation in Korea however, successive Army 
Governor-Generals were able to make a complete end run around the Constitution by invoking the 
importance of a free hand as being necessary for effective Japanese control over a location of such 
high strategic importance. The conventional view of Taiwan’s lesser strategic importance within 
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Japan may have left Taiwan’s overlords with no equivalent excuse for such a salutary avoidance of 
constitutional authority.42  
In tandem with reformist efforts directed toward the colonies from within the homeland 
there emerged a number of groups proposing greater rights for Taiwanese on the island. Initially the 
groups were led by young Japanese-educated Chinese who, with Government encouragement, called 
for the abolition of old pre-colonial practices including the wearing of queues, foot binding, and 
opium smoking. Though not all groups wished Taiwan to be assimilated into another prefecture of 
metropolitan Japan per se, they nevertheless saw Japan as a giver of modernity to their island and 
thus were not greatly opposed to Taiwan’s legal inclusion within the modern metropole.43 However 
much these groups’ specific goals may have differed with the assimilationist rhetoric of Japanese 
liberal reformers, both sides saw enough commonality of purpose to decide to work together. Yet 
assimilationist parties on Taiwan would be short lived as the groups quickly ran into vitriolic 
opposition from Japanese settlers on the island unwilling to entertain the possibility of Taiwanese 
enjoying, de jure, all the rights they hoped to keep to themselves. Opposition was also great from 
colonial bureaucrats, many of whom echoed Goto’s earlier belief that encouraging such groups 
would mean the Government’s tacit approval of faster assimilationist methods, thus setting the 
scene for violent native resistance.  Still others argued for greater attention to the responsibilities of 
the colonial subject before equal rights could be discussed.44  
Discussion over the proper management of colonial peoples from the First World War to 
the end of the 1920s was made moot by the acceleration of wartime demands following Japan’s 
increased involvement in China. From 1931 on, and particularly from late 1936 until the end of 
WWII in August 1945, it became readily apparent to colonial governments that the time needed for 
long-term assimilation to come to fruition could not be assured. Slowly facing this reality and 
needing to press the colonies into service as sources of men and material for Japan’s accelerating 
war-effort, colonial bureaucracies began implementing the kominka campaign, a program to rapidly 
turn subject peoples into loyal, thoroughly Japanese, subjects of the Emperor.45 The gravity of the 
international situation Japan now found itself in was first of all reflected in the reversion in 1936 to 
the appointment of active duty or retired military men as Taiwan Governors after a long period of 
civilian career bureaucrats holding the post since 1919.46 Interestingly kominka in both Taiwan and 
Korea can be seen as yet another interpretation of the extension of isshi-doujin. In the case of this 
newest program, however, the aim was not the duplication of the rights available to subjects of the 
metropole in the colonies but rather insistence on a complete cultural merger of Taiwan and Korea 
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in the image of the homeland. Just as importantly, in view of the increasing need for the colonies to 
shoulder an increasing burden of service to the war effort, the kominka movement pressed for the 
extension of the full obligations of the Japanese subject to all colonial peoples. In Taiwan the 
kominka movement was ushered in directly after the arrival of retired Admiral Kobayashi Seizo as 
Governor General in September 1936. The former Naval Officer proclaimed the inauguration of the 
movement within the colony as one policy of a three policy agenda to be pursued by his office to 
further industrialize and fortify the island.47 The movement was announced in Korea sometime later 
through an oath to be made by Koreans affirming their loyalty Imperial Japan as its subjects.48 The 
absence of such an oath in Taiwan has suggested to some observers that the loyalty of Taiwanese 
toward Japan was never clearly doubted by the colonial authorities, which was not the case of Korea. 
The latter colony, in spite of equivalent modernization completed under Japanese auspices, 
continued to demonstrate much antagonism to colonial imposition. Whatever the actual reasons for 
the use of an oath to assure loyalty in Korea and such a document’s absence in Taiwan, the 
Taiwanese reaction to the sub-movements under the umbrella of kominka policy were different than 
in Korea even though the government’s directives were essentially the same.  
Overall, kominka in both colonies consisted of four distinct policies. “Religious reform” 
meant the discouragement of traditional local beliefs and the substitution of State Shinto in their 
place. The “national language movement” was intended to denigrate the speaking of local languages 
in favor of Japanese. The “name changing movement” outlined the mandatory taking of Japanese 
names by the colonial population, and the “military volunteers movement” was designed to 
encourage active colonial participation in the war effort through voluntary enlistment in the armed 
forces.49  
The “religious reform” plank of the kominka agenda, as pursued in Taiwan, attempted to 
wean all Taiwanese away from traditional beliefs. The island’s Chinese majority saw its traditional 
religious practices, a syncretic blend of Taoism, Mahayana Buddhism and Confucian morality, 
criticized by Japanese authorities. Chinese’ funerary practices were also inveighed against as 
“unclean” and the population in question was encouraged to adopt cremation or Shinto funerary 
rites instead of their longstanding custom.50 More draconian tactics pursued by Governor Kobayashi 
to force Shinto on Taiwanese, which included demolishing Taoist temples, were halted by 
Kobayashi’s successor, though less extreme forms of coercion toward the practice of Shinto 
continued.51 Those in authority hoping to spread Shinto’s roots on the island found the way hard 
going. Local resentment against Government support of Shinto was never as violent as in Korea but 
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shortly after this point and the volunteer movement remained in place until early 1945 when the 
exigencies of the grim war situation for Japan forced the conscription of all male, military age 
Taiwanese who could be spared for service.57  
Overall, kominka was never as qualified a success in Taiwan as its planners hoped, but it was 
much less resisted than in Korea. It is no doubt a credit to the widespread perception among 
islanders that Japanese colonialism benefited them that, in spite of being forcibly compelled to quite 
literally become Japanese from 1937-45, Taiwanese would remember Japanese rule almost with 
fondness in the years directly after the war.  
 
Korea: Hard Going 
In marked contrast to the style of governance employed in Taiwan, Japan generally ruled 
Korea in the colonial period with a greater resort to force for several reasons. Perhaps most 
importantly, uncharitable Korean views of Japanese intervention were informed by the pre-colonial 
political experience - almost entirely the opposite of peripheral Taiwan. Korea, by the beginning of 
the period of major Western expansion in East Asia, had been securely within the orbit of Qing 
China. Its own Yi Dynasty, having ruled since 1392, had created a peninsular nation wherein the 
Great Tradition – never successfully a part of the average Taiwanese world view – was tightly 
enforced via a four step caste system.58 This system also played a leading role in Yi Dynasty Korea’s 
view of its place in the world. The Yi King recognized Korea’s place essentially as a highly 
autonomous vassal state having a tributary relationship with the Qing court. Japan’s emergence as a 
modern state during the 1860s and 1870s was difficult for the Yi court under the rule of Taewongun 
- regent to the young King Kojong - to even conceptualize, let alone accept. The reason for such 
difficulty had much to do with Korea’s view of China as the center of power in the world. The 
change in the Japan-Korea relationship from a relationship between a disunited island nation ruled 
only at some distance by a Shogun and a proud appendicular kingdom to China was occasioned by 
Japan’s notification of the “restoration” of its Emperor and accompanying unification and 
modernization. The court in Seoul, long used to conducting business through the Japanese daimyo at 
Tsushima with the occasional recognition of the Shogunate’s authority, assumed Japan now wished 
to claim Korea as its vassalage. Hence, the modern relationship between the two nations began over 
a dispute based upon two irreconcilable normative views of statecraft and what the term “relations” 
meant. To a Japan eagerly pursuing recognition as a thoroughly modern power worthy of respect by 
Western powers, Korean insistence that Japan’s pursuit of “modern” bi-lateral relations from a 19th 
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century Western standpoint was actually an attempt to subordinate Korea under an outmoded 
conception of statecraft, was perplexing.59 Clearly, according to many of the Meiji oligarchs then in 
power, Korean intransigence and unwillingness to open itself to Japan and see Japan as its equal, was 
an egregious insult. To the Yi court, which defined itself as a loyal tribute state to China, Japan’s 
newfound belief in itself as “modern” was equally bizarre; its request for relations outside the 
hierarchical structure of Great Tradition statecraft was downright arrogant. Thus grudges were 
nursed by both sides from the first rumblings of Japan’s eagerness to adopt a bigger role in the 
world as a united nation.  Some Meiji leaders opted, after the initial Korean brush-off of the 1860s, 
to “subdue” the country and thus avenge the earlier slight. Yet not all were of one mind as to how to 
go about “subduing” Korea. Initial plans called for a punitive invasion that would double as a 
diversionary tactic for the Government to draw the attention of disenfranchised Samurai away from 
the recent moratorium on their government stipends.60  
Fortunately for Korea, the non-interventionists within Meiji cabinets of the early 1870s 
gained a deciding hold over Korea policy. Consequently, the mention of such an expedition was 
dropped out of concern that Japan was not yet strong enough to tackle the Qing over Korea as well 
as concern over the reaction of Western powers. Less emotional circumstances than returning a 
diplomatic slight were also at the forefront of emerging Japanese policy toward Korea. Great Power 
activity in the area convinced many Japanese leaders early on of the necessity for a special Japanese 
relationship with the peninsula, since monopolization of Korea by untrustworthy Westerners would 
severely impinge on Japan’s own security. Such talk had begun in earnest with the arrival of a 
Russian warship at Tsushima prior to the Restoration.61 It had only grown in the context of Japan’s 
emerging modernization and Korean rebuffs to Japanese requests of normal relations subsequent to 
1868.  
Aspirations among many Meiji era politicians and thinkers for a technological and cultural 
uplifting of Korea under Japanese aegis were equally strong persuaders for an interventionist policy 
toward the country. Korean regent Taewongun’s refutation of Japan’s description of itself as 
achieving modernity caused Meiji opinion-makers to defensively disparage Korean culture, 
knowledge of the outside world, and technological prowess. Such invidious comparisons of Japan to 
Korea were not an end in themselves, rather, many prominent voices inside and outside of the 
government hoped, Korea could be changed from the inside out under the watchful eye of Japan. 
Just as in Taiwan, almost all Meiji personalities recognized the inherent cultural similarity between 
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Japan and Korea but used this acknowledged similarity to lend urgency to their desire to modernize 
Korea through means of Korea’s own “Restoration”, via Japanese tutelage.62  
These feelings of highly paternalistic sympathy among some Japanese elites for Korea 
remained after Japan wrangled open select Korean treaty ports after 1876 – an act that was rightly 
seen as echoing the forcing of Western “unequal treaties” upon Japan in the 1850s and 1860s.63 
Nevertheless, close comparisons came to be made by Meiji oligarch’s between the Korea they 
encountered and their own fresh memory of Japan’s recent past. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a junior ranking 
Samurai/turned Restorationist/turned founder of Japan’s largest private university, sentimentally 
compared the visit of a Korean delegation to Japan in 1881 with Japan’s 1861 mission to the West in 
which Fukuzawa had played a part.64 Even Fukuzawa’s ruminations about a preferred Japanese 
approach to Korea began to harden. They were expressed most clearly in his memoirs where he 
urged Japan to “get out of Asia” and begin to treat less civilized Asian nations as contemptuously as 
did the West.65  
The geopolitical considerations that had framed the earlier debate over punitive action 
against Korea in 1873 were again raised by Imperial Army Chief of Staff Yamagata Aritomo in 1902 
after Qing China’s 1895 defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. Yamagata echoed his Prussian 
advisor’s earlier estimation of Korea as “a dagger” pointed at the home-islands.66 To the minds of 
Yamagata and his like-minded peers, the only suitable way to sheath the offending dagger was 
through outright Japanese control.  
China’s defeat not only removed a significant contender with Japan for power in Korea. The very 
idea that “upstart” Japan could defeat Asia’s largest land-based Empire gave further credence to the 
growing belief that Japan was the new center of East Asian power. By virtue of China’s humiliation, 
some thought it should also become the towering example of modernity for the emulation of 
Japan’s neighbors.  
Supporters of Japanese Korea policy championing reform - as distinct from colonial 
conquest - still maintained sufficient political support to fend off the likes of Yamagata and others, 
but the primary exponent of reform, Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, felt compelled to reach a happy 
medium with harder edged elements of the government. The result was a Japanese Protectorate 
begun in 1905 after the defeat of Russia, overseen by a Japanese Resident General. The continuing 
Korean behavior of playing Japan off against other competing powers occasioned an initial Japanese 
response to Korea’s annexation in 1910, every bit as brutal as the bandit-suppression raids seen in 
Taiwan.67 The Japanese response to anti-Japanese resistance was likely as brutal as it was owing to 
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the very different nature of the Korean resistance from that on Taiwan. Whereas Taiwan’s 
peripheral relationship to China’s central government and the ruling ethic of self interest on the 
island diffused resistance, the reality of Korea as a kingdom of its own focused resistance as it could 
never be in Taiwan. The main form of colonial Korea’s first violent opposition, the uibyong, or 
Righteous Army, concentrated the energies of Japanese forces.68 The perception on the part of 
Japanese authorities that they oversaw a colony that was essentially an armed and hostile country 
deserving only of military Governorship and administrative independence from the metropole 
government was thus easily reinforced. Early Japanese governance of Korea then proceeded along 
similar lines as early governance of Taiwan with one major exception. Anti-Japanese demonstrations 
in May 1919 in Korea, following similar protests in China, led to calls among Japanese intelligentsia 
in the home islands for more enlightened colonial government that would truly live up to the ideal 
of isshi-doujin. Ironically, the reforms were never applied to Korea, though slight modifications were 
made to the relationship between the Home Government and Taiwan’s Government-General. 
Indeed, some historians have noted that the only change in Korea’s government was purely 
cosmetic. For a decade and a half after 1919 the colony’s military governors made public 
appearances in civilian attire rather than in customary uniform.69  
The basic outline of early Japanese colonialism in Korea remained similar to that on Taiwan, 
yet there were differences. In the realm of education, the authorities copied the Taiwan Governor 
General’s toleration of native language schools as well as government’s careful cultivation of good 
relations with Confucian scholarly elites. However, Korea went through a brief period of 
nationalism during the late Yi Dynasty with the beginning of the “education for the nation” 
movement. Here, the Dynasty encouraged the growth of county schools that included some topics 
relating to the reality of the wider world in its curriculum.70 Nothing resembling the Korean 
movement of the late Yi period, as abortive as it may well had been, ever existed on Taiwan. This 
meant that Taiwan authorities’ goals were relatively straightforward: undermine the private schools 
and increase enrollment to Japanese funded schools. In Korea, however, Japanese officials needed to 
achieve this overarching goal not only without goading the classically Chinese educated yangban class 
into resistance, but also while trying to undercut the country schools which were acute incubators of 
Korean nationalism and anti-Japanese feeling. The same approach that had been tried on Taiwan 
eventually ended the danger to Japanese mandated Korean education posed by the “education for 
the nation” movement. A strong national identity - a perhaps-natural outcome from six centuries of 
control by one dynasty over a single, ethnically homogenous people - could not, however, be so 
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easily overcome. In a situation directly opposite to the one in Taiwan – where a Japanese education 
eventually became an accepted part of life for most islanders and was even accepted by traditional 
elite, Korea proved more difficult. Although yangban opposition to Japan may not have been 
singularly notable – perhaps a sign that Japan’s early courting of this Korean elite did what it was 
calculated to do – other sources of Korean identity threw up roadblocks to Japanese efforts to 
extend and deepen their control. Christian missionaries, long active in Yi Dynasty Korea continued 
to be active after annexation although relations between them and the Japanese, initially pleasant if 
not cordial, declined. Japanese authorities were continually irritated at missionary accounts of 
Japanese actions that were not always according to the interpretation most welcomed by the 
Governor General.71 More to the point, mission schools competed with Japanese run “ordinary 
schools” for students among the mass of the Korean population, challenging the commonplace 
Meiji and Taisho era Japanese conceit that modernity could only be wrought in the colonies through 
exclusively Japanese leadership and education, Christian schools also competed with Japanese 
institutions and were among the first sources of Western scientific and political ideas in the 
peninsula.  
The kominka movement, previously described mainly in the Taiwanese context, had 
summarily different effects, and evoked a customarily different reaction due to a number of reasons 
including historical Korean cultural cohesion and the memory of an equally cohesive indigenous pre-
colonial political order.  
The insistence of Korean Government General officials on a literal oath for recitation 
among Koreans bespeaks the lower expectation among colonial officials of Koreans’ capacity for 
quick assimilation at the campaign’s outset. The “national language” movement to supplant Korean 
with Japanese seems to have been more coercive than the corresponding effort in Taiwan. 
Responsibility for the existence of a much more coercive policy may not have lain with Japanese 
alone. Undoubtedly, authorities expected that any attempt to diminish the standing of Korean in 
favor of Japanese would undoubtedly be greatly resisted by the people - as indeed it was – thus, a 
more gentle, persuasive policy was doomed to certain failure and only sufficient force could 
guarantee compliance. Confidence in Taiwan’s population for compliance by authorities there 
seemed to have been much greater, as implied by the absence of a loyalty oath, and a coercive 
campaign that was unnecessary on the island.72  
“Religious reform,” the institution of State Shinto in Korea, fared about as well as in Taiwan 
although Korean unwillingness to adopt even perfunctory obeisance to Shinto was marked while 
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even Taiwanese Christians paid lip service to the Emperor’s position as descendent of Amaterasu 
Omikami.73 The prevalence of Christianity, particularly evangelical sects within Korea, made 
participation by most Korean Christians in Shinto rites or obsequiousness to the Emperor as earthly 
intercessor to the Shinto pantheon, tantamount to worship in a false religion. The “name changing” 
campaign, however, evinced the most widespread and dramatic accounts of Korean distress. The 
practical effect of the campaign followed the one in Taiwan - those having adopted Japanese names 
usually retained in their new name some form of reference to their indigenous name. Yet Taiwanese 
acceptance of new names was largely absent in Korea. The immediate Korean reaction was one of 
grief at the perceived loss of filial ties with ancestors upon their adoption of new names.74  
Conclusion 
Altogether, Japanese colonizers advanced remarkably similar rationales in each of Japan’s 
two biggest colonies. The early emphasis on association and a gradual merger of each colonial 
populace into the empire was replaced due to the vicissitudes of the changing international situation 
and Japan’s place within it. Such changes disrupted the slow process of colonial maturation to the 
ideal of the metropole. The change was exemplified by the urgency inherent in the aims for quick 
cultural parity between Japan and the colonies and an increased need for colonial assistance in war, 
found in kominka pronouncements nearing the end of the Empire.  
Specific changes in Japanese governance occurred in each colony, both as a result of each 
locale’s pre-colonial history - which predisposed each colony for either relative docility or obstinacy 
toward Japanese rule - and the colonial authorities’ reaction to it. Though certain policies carried out 
were virtually identical in intent, and even in name, their application was substantially different due 
to the colonial peoples’ cultural and historical make-up, Japanese responses, and different concerns 
regarding each colony among political leaders in the home islands.  
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